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ADDRESS
BY
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE

12:45 P.M.
FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1976
MAYFLOWER HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

To start with what may seem far afield of· whatever
subject I have, I should like to refer to an article by
Professor James McGann in a magazine called "Critical Inquiry,"
That article, which is on the function of criticism, builds
upon the work of Professor Harold Bloom in a series of essays
published a few years ago under the tftle "Ringers in the,
Tower," with the subtitle "Studies in Romantic Tradition."
Bloom's essay on Ruskin as Literary Critic provides McGann
with material for exhibiting a central conflict.
concerns the role of the critic.

The conflict

The conflict is between the

virtue of accuracy and the virtue of the "more imaginative act
of vision."
as saying:

As to the virtue 'of accuracy, Ruskin is quoted
"The greatest thing

a human

soul ever does in

this world is to see something, and to tell wbat he saw in a
plain way."

But Ruskin as a prophet, as he grew older, was

more captured by the apocalyptic yearnings of mankind, in
which seeing becomes an act of prophecy, a penetration into
the "life of things," a finding of the truth of imagination.
McGann describes the force of this conflict upon Ruskin as
finally bringing on what Ruskin described as the Storm Cloud
of his later years, when he was beset by a special madness.
I trust I may be forgiven for borrowing this fugitive
material so imperfectly from a sister branch of the humanities.

The problem of the conflict is one with which law is fully
familiar.

We are well aware of the duty and difficulties of

attaining accurate description, and the importance of the
craftsmanship of detail.

We also know that the foreseeability

inherent in our judgments lurks in all the ambiguities, not
only of speech, but of what we in fact see, or wish to have
accomplished.
be-~and

So the Restatement

o~

Law often cannot help but

sometimes is intended to be--a predictor--some would

say a vision--of better things to come.

I do not suggest that

this should lead us, as perhaps it did Ruskin, to almost
total incapacitation.

We are accustomed to the problem.

Our

system of law is arranged so that we can argue about what we
see or ought to see.
You may indeed wonder, as I have, what has brought me to
the idea of the suitability of this story about a somewhat
mad genius and his view of art, as

app~opriate

for this occasion.

The answer is that a major problem for government today, a
major problem for the vitality of a democracy, and a major problev.1
for the administration of justice

is

the achievement of a

shared and accurate perception of events and problems.
the accuracy is most difficult to attain.

But

In an age of most

extensive and rapid communication, somehow accuracy gets lost.
In an age of creativity in the law, our perception of what the
problem is can be clouded by the very techniques which have
been used to make change possible.

All of this is perhaps a prologue to some obvious
concerns which I have.

One concern, which I believe is of

general importance, is the image of the Deparonent of Justice.
It is well enough to say that in the long run it is the
reality and not the image which counts, but because of past
events and because of the ways of our present society, the
reality can become lost in the constant stream of images

•

which'may be quite false.

It is with some diffidence that I ,illustrate this
problem.

But I want to give two recent examples.

The first

comes from an article by I. F, Stone in the New York Review
of Bo'oks.

Mr. Stone wrote, lilt is depressing that despite

all we now know Attorney General Levi has rejected
recommendations from within the Department for an independent
citizens I, investigation of the (Martin Luther) King assassination
and insists on turning it back for
the FBI."
were wrong.

anothe~

self-inquiry by

Stone was trying to make a point, but his facts
The investigation of whether the FBI was involved

in any way in the assassination of Dr. King has not been turned
over to the FBI.

I ,have assigned Michael Shaheen, the

Department of Justice Counsel on Professional Responsibility, to
recruit a number of attorneys and others to investigate that
issue thoroughly and independently and to report their
conclusions and rec01lllI1endations to me.

'I have also directed

Mr. Shaheen to investigate whether the FBI's investigation into

the assassination was thorough and honest, whether any
information concerning the assassination has come to the
attention of the Department which should be dealt with
by appropriate authorities, and whether the nature of the
relationship between the Bureau and Dr. King calls for
prosecution, disciplinary proceedings or other appropriate
action.
The second illustration derives from one of the reports
of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations
. with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

In the first

paragraph of :its report on Warrantless Surreptitious Entries,
the Committee included this sentence:

"Since 1960, more than

five hundred warrantless surreptitious microphone installations
against intelligence and internal security targets have been
conducted by the FBI, a technique which the Justice Department
still permits."

The careful -or unintended ambiguity in that

sentence conveyed a misimpression which was widespread when
reported by the media.

It could easily be read, and doubtless

was read by some, to mean that the Department of Justice still
conducts warrantless electronic surveillance against "i.nternal
security" targets--that is,
threat to national security.

dom~stic

groups perceived to be a

The Supreme Court decision in

United States v. United States District Court, however,
prohibited warrantless electronic surveillance of targets
unconnected with foreign powers.

The Department of Justice

does not use warrantless electronic surveillance against

anyone who is not the agent of a foreign power.

One of the

first things I did when I came to the Department of Justice
was to try to be clear about the policy in this area.
discussed it time and again.

I

To make the point that domestic

security surveillance was not involved, I stated on July 9,
1975, that .at that time there was no warrantless surveillance
directed at an American citizen.

This has been true for the

entire period since that time as well.

It should be no surprise,

and hardly news, that the Department 'of Justice does engage
in warrantless electronic surveillance under strict procedures.
Former Attorney General Richardson annouRced that policy in a
September 12, 1973. letter to

Senato~

Fulbright after the

decision in United States v. United States District Court.
On numerous occasions I have announced the number of warrantless
electronic surveillances that'have been authorized, each
time stressing that they are directed only against agents of
foreign powers.

The Department engages in warrantless electronic

surveillance because of the curious shape of the law in this
area which assumes that the Department will undertake 'this
activity.

I have said that the state of the law is 'unfortunate

and should be clarified by legislation. executive policymaking and court decisions.

Mislead'ing statements' such as the

Committee's reference to internal security surveillances make
this clarification di.fficul t.

Such statements, which are fairly typical and for which
I assess no

blam~

because they are to be expected in the way

things work, reflect undoubtedly a noble objective.

Perhaps

they are intended to look beyond the details to the spirit.
But they mislead and they disfigure.

They impede the work of

reconstruction.
Most difficult in the process of reconstruction are those

areas of law and administration where basic individual rights
and bona fide national security are involved.

In these areas

it is essential that the government take special precautions
to be thoughtful and knowledgeable about what it does.

The

scrutiny is made more difficult because the informed
reactions which would otherwise come from the society at
large either do not come or are distorted because of the long
term effects of secrecy.
As far as electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence,
we must. recognize that we are dealing with practices and
procedures of government that have been kept in relative
secrecy for 36 years.

Each Attorney General since Attorney

General Jackson--along with Congress and the courts--has played
a role in one way or another in carrying on or creating the
present system.

Faced with this problem my associates and I

determined that, while we knew it would be an extremely
difficult task, the best course would be to achieve legislation
in this area.

The President some weeks ago announced that he was
seeking bipartisan support for the legislation.

The Department

has worked with members of both parties in the Senate and the
House and has consulted with a number of distinguished lawyers
and legal scholars,some of whom are present today.

It is

often said that while present administration practices with
respect to warrantless electronic surveillance may be
sufficiently protective of individual rights, there is no
assurance that these practices will continue.
will meet this concern.

It is innovative.

administration has ever taken before.

The legislation

It is a step no

And because I think it

is so extremely important, I want to impose upon you at this
time to bring some of its details to your attention.
The bill provides for a suitable judicial warrant
procedure by which applications specifically authorized by
the Attorney General in each case, under general authorization
by the President, would be made to one of seven district court
judges designated by the Chief Justice.

Appeals from a denial

of the warrant application would be taken to a special court of
appeals made up of a presiding judge and two other judges
designated by the Chief Justice.

The United States would have

the right to appeal an affirmance of denial to the Supreme Court.
The bill would provide for electronic surveillance for the
gathering of foreign intelligence information which is defined as:
first, information relating to the ability of the United States to
protect itself from actual or potential attack or other
hostile acts of a foreignpoweri or second, information with

respect to foreign powers or territories which, because of
its importance, is deemed essential to the security or
national defense of the nation or to the conduct of the
foreign affairs of the United States; or third, information
relating to the ab:f.lity of the United States to protect
the national security against foreign intelligence activities.
The judge would receive a certificat~on by an appropriate
Presidential appointee that the information sought is
foreign intelligence information as defined.

The judge would

be authorized to issue a warrant if he finds probable cause
to believe that the subject of the interception is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power.

Foreign power is defined

as including "foreign governments, factions of a foreign
government, foreign parties, foreign military forces,
enterprises controlled by such entities, or organizations
composed of such entities, whether or not recognized by the
United States, or foreign-based terrorist groupa·. It Special
protection is accorded United States citizens and permanent
resident aliens in the definition of agent of a foreign power,
which is as follows:

"a person who is not a permanent

resident alien or citizen of the United States and who is
an officer or employee of a foreign power; or . . . a person
who. pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, is engaged
in clandestine intelligence activities, or who conspires
with, or knowingly aids or abets such a person in engaging
in such activities."

It has been urged that at least as to citizens and
permanent resident aliens, even if they are clandestine
intelligence agents of a foreign power,there should be no
electronic surveillance absent a showing of probable cause
that a crime has been or is about to be committed.
does not adopt that approach.

The bill

The espionage laws' simply do

not make all clandestine intelligence. activities undertaken
on behalf of a foreign power criminal.

To change them to

encompass all such activities would be difficult and could
make the espionage laws too broad.

The spirit behind the

suggestion that electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
be tied strictly to violations of law derives, I suppose, from
a perceived need for complete symmetry between this area and
the traditional law enforcement area.

But the symmetry may

not be possible in the working out of the details of policy,
no matter how inviting it may be in its spirit.
In addition to the probable cause requirement, the bill
provides that the judge must also be convinced that
"minimization procedures to be followed are reasonably
designed to minimize the acquisition and retention of
information relating to permanent resident aliens or citizens
of the United States that is not foreign intelligence infor
mation."

Thus we have tried to limit both the scope of

acquisition and the retention of overheard information.

We recognize that there may be an argument that the
limited sort of determinations to be made by judges under
this legislation might not be appropriate judicial' business.
The bill follows

. what we regard as the implied suggestions

of Justice Lewis Powell in the

A1media~Sanchez

and Keith cases

that special warrant procedures can be fashioned to meet
the unique circumstances that arise in

~his

area.

The bill defines electronic surveillance as the
interception of radio communications that begin and end in
the United States and all wiretap and microphone surveillances
within the United States.

This definition does not include

intelligence gathering by sophisticated electronic means
directed at international communications.

For this reason,

the bill contains a section concerning Presidential power.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 included a proviso reserving the President's
power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for
certain described purposes.

The Supreme Court, in United

States v. United States District Court wrote that Congress,
by this proviso in Title III, left Presidential power where
it found it. It held that there was no Presidential power to
conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of individuals or
groups which have no foreign connection.

In the latest version

of the legislative proposal the section concerning Presidential
power states that nothing in the bill or in the Communications
Act of 1934 "shall be deemed to affect the exercise of any

constitutional power the President may have to acquire
foreign intelligence information if (a) such acquisition
does not come within the definition of electronic surveillance
in the bill, "or, (b) the facts and circumstances giving
rise to the acquisition are so unprecedented and potentially
harmful to the nation that they cannot be reasonably said to
have been within the contemplation of Co.ngress in enacting
this chapter."

The first part of this section is meant to

leave untouched a program of surveillance of international
communications which simply does not fit the kind of analysis
and system this bill would impose.

This is not to say that

legislation is impossible nor that safeguards cannot be
designed and implemented.
are already in effect.

Special protective procedures

But an effort to treat this program

in the context of the proposed bill would not be useful.
The second half of the section of the bill concerning
Presidential power represents the lawyer·s concern for
providing for all possible eventualities.

This may seem akin

to the vision of the apocalyptic poet, but it serves an
important purpose.

By stating a provision to provide for a

situation of utmost danger, one also narrowly and carefully
delimits what it is that can be considered as such a situation
in the future.

It is at least as important as a guarantee that

the standards and procedures in the bill' will be followed
in all foreseeable circumstances as it is as a hedge against
the unforeseeable.

One other feature of the bill has raised some questions-
the lack of a notice requirement such as the one included
in Title III.

While there may be some disagreement about

this, the special nature of the foreign intelligence field,
when foreign powers or their intelligence agents are involved,
makes such notice inappropriate,

Notice would destroy

sensitive investigations, cause great risks to individuals
cooperating with the investigations and sometimes have other
serious implications.

While it is not possible to convince

everyone on this point, I believe most will recognize the
validity of these reasons,
The proposed legislation covers an area that until now
has been thought not to be amenable to statutory control.
That generally has been the position for 36 years.

I

believe that if enacted it will be an important step in
the restatement, reshaping and advancement of the law.

If

it is not enacted, I fear much time may pass before another
legislative effort goes forward.
I need hardly tell the American Law Institute that the
law does not just simply clarify itself.

The clarification

requires a willingness to raise issues, to confront problems,
to articulate principles, to test these principles through
their meaning in application.

Many of the

p~oblems

with which

the law deals raise the most complex social issues; they have
been surrounded with controversy.

They must be approached

with care and responsibility.
enormous.

The difficulties can be

But if our law is to be a vital and responsive

force--if indeed it is to be a rule of law--then we must
not hide from the hard questions.

We can only hope that

the spirit of candor and thoughtfulness with which these
issues are approached will be understood.

Let me add that

for many of these areas, the work of the American Law Institute
itself has helped and can help to lead the way.
I think, a great deal for all of us to do.

There is,

